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This article discusses the use of informal practices in negotiating welfare with state in-
stitutions in Azerbaijan. One of the effects of transition to market economies in the post-
socialist countries has been the partial withdrawal of the state from welfare provision and
residualization of welfare. Recent research has shown that informal practices play an
important role in “structuring welfare from below” (Morris & Polese, 2014b) across post-
socialist realm. Based on in-depth interviews with engineers at different periods of their
careers, namely mid-career, working pensioners, and engineering students, this article
demonstrates how formal and informal institutions and practices are strategically used by
individuals, families, and low level bureaucrats to achieve desired career and welfare goals.
Rather than compensating for the deﬁciencies of formal rules and institutions, formal and
informal are intertwined and merged and are actively employed both by the citizens and
state institutions.
Copyright © 2014, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European
countries have been at the center of research on informality
and informalization for some time. Both scholarly and lay
observers of the region have noted the rampant growth of a
wide range of informal practices, including self-provision
and mutual aid, the rise of the informal economy and
what is generally known as the corruption of the public
sector. In much research, this growth of informal practices
has been directly linked to transition and the transitologicalwhose constructive
arch Center, Hanyang
nter, Hanyang University. Prodparadigm: the withdrawal of the state from much of the
activities it used to perform in socialist times and weak
market institutions were seen as the main reasons behind
the spread of informality. This perspective essentially fol-
lows the developmental approach to informality adopted
by international organizations from the 1970s onwards.
The concept of ‘informal economy’ itself was coined by
anthropologist Keith Hart (1973), in his work on the urban
poor in Ghana, and referred to the diverse activities of the
self-employed. As the concept became institutionalized in
the framework of international development organizations,
the informal economy became understood as a feature of
poverty and underdevelopment, characterized by low
productivity, low levels of skills and technology, and low
capacity for accumulation (Portes & Haller, 2005: 404).
From this perspective, the growth of informality in post-
socialist countries is seen as a temporary phenomenonuction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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sition moves towards completion, the new state and mar-
ket institutions take root, and stateesociety relations
assume a more or less permanent shape. However, this
‘optimistic’ view has not beenmaterializing. Instead, recent
research shows that informality in post-socialist countries
is as pervasive as ever, taking on new forms that can also be
found elsewhere in Western Europe and beyond (Giordano
& Hayoz, 2013; Morris & Polese, 2014a; Polese, Morris,
Kovacs, & Harboe, in press). Rather than a transitional
stage on the path to development, post-socialist infor-
mality is assuming the forms of ‘informalization’ as
described by Castells and Portes (1989), who noted how
formal structures of the state or established market in-
stitutions increasingly use informal practices.
Because of its spread andvariety of forms, informality has
been difﬁcult to deﬁne and conceptualize. As Misztal (2002:
18) notes “the concept of informality often seems to be
treated as a very convenient device, used to explain almost
everything that is new or points to new trends or new
fashion”. In social science, informality is one of the most
interdisciplinary concepts, addressed differently by anthro-
pology, sociology, andpolitical science.With regards to post-
socialist informality, several frameworks can be identiﬁed:
informality as self-provision; the informal economy and
informal employment, and informality within state in-
stitutions, which usually includes corruption and patron-
eclient relationships (B€orzel & Pamuk, 2012; Clarke, 2002;
Karklins, 2005; Stefes, 2005; Williams, 2008; Williams &
Nadin, 2011). Interpersonal networks, from family and
mutual aid to patron-client ties within political elites, has
beenanotherpopular topic for researchon informalityas it is
one of the main mechanisms through which informality
operates (Ledeneva, 1998, 2008; Lonkila, 2010).
In recent years, this research on post-socialist infor-
mality has begun to extend beyond these traditional
spheres towards the informal provision of social welfare.
This is a very important addition to the debate, as welfare
provision remains an area from which the post-socialist
state did not withdraw as much as it did from the regula-
tion of economy and the labor market. Yet, as recent
research demonstrates, informal welfare provision is used
to ﬁll in the large area between what “the state claims to
do” and what it is “doing in reality” (Polese et al., in press).
At the same time, the public sector which is still respon-
sible for state welfare provision, is itself permeated by
informal practices and corruption.
In this paper, I wish to contribute to this debate by
looking into how engineers in Azerbaijan use informal
practices in shaping theirwork andwelfare strategies. I take
as a point of departure Soviet ‘cradle-to-grave’ universal
welfare provision, which included, in addition to pensions
and other social beneﬁts, free healthcare, childcare, and
education (Cook, 1993). Despite post-Soviet residualization
of statewelfare provision, people's expectations of what are
the desired living standards, and what should be the role of
the state inproviding them, remain largely shaped by Soviet
practices (Cook, 2007; Lipsmeyer, 2003). When the state
does not fulﬁll those expectations, individuals and families
do not simply give up on their expectations, but try to ‘ﬁll in
the gaps’ on their own to achieve the desired standards ofliving. Informal practices play an important role in the
repertoire of actions aimed at achieving these desired
outcomes.
I build on a basic understanding of informality as a form
of social action that aims to avoid or circumvent existing
formal regulations to bring down transaction costs (B€or€ocz,
2000). Informal is also generally understood in relation to
the formal, whether it is seen as the product of formaliza-
tion (Stark, 1989), or as complementing the formal (Polese
et al., 2014), or making up for the deﬁciencies of the formal
institutions and procedures (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004;
Ledeneva, 1998). In this paper, my focus is on the ways in
which individuals and families interact with state in-
stitutions and strategically combine both formal and
informal practices to achieve desired welfare outcomes. In
this, I follow Anne Swidler's (1986: 277) deﬁnition of
strategy as “a general way of organizing action […] that
might allow one to reach several different life goals”.
Consequently, instead of limitingmyself to a particular type
of informal practice such as informal employment or the
use of interpersonal networks, I look at any informal
practices that are used by or applied to my informants for
such welfare-related strategic purposes.
Engineers are an interesting group to look at from the
point of view of informality. Previously a Soviet ‘default
profession’ along with doctors and teachers, in the post-
Soviet period engineers were socially dislocated to a
greater extent compared to other Soviet professionals due
to the processes of deindustrialization. Their engagement
with the informal economy and other informal practices
has differed in signiﬁcant respects from those of doctors
and teachers. Thus, doctors and teachers, while severely
underfunded, for the most part retained their jobs in the
public sector, and used out-of-pocket informal payments or
private medical or tutoring practice to complement their
declining incomes (Morris & Polese, 2014b; Osipian, 2009;
Polese, 2008; Rzayeva, 2013; Temple & Petrov, 2004). En-
gineers on the other hand experienced unemployment to a
greater extent, as many of their workplaces were either
closed or downsized in the course of post-Soviet deindus-
trialization. Instead of supplementing their incomes with
informal payments for their formal work, former engineers
were more prone to taking up employment in the informal
sector as a primary livelihood strategy. Taxi-driving and
various work in the construction sector are two paradig-
matic informal occupations for former male engineers
across post-Soviet space, while female engineers usually
engaged in domestic work, childcare, and sometimes
tutoring. But even for those few engineers whowere able to
retain their jobs in the public sector, the speciﬁcity of en-
gineering work rarely allowed them to partake in the
practices of informal out-of-pocket payments that is so
widely spread both in the educational and healthcare
settings. Instead, they often combined formal jobs with
other, non-professional income-generating activities. In
Azerbaijan, this dynamic was especially interesting as post-
socialist deindustrialization in manufacturing sector was
combinedwith expanding employment opportunities in oil
industry and construction sectors.
Despite consistent reports of high levels of informal and
shadow economies (Schneider, 2009; Yoon, Reilly, Krstic, &
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remains rather limited. Here, I focus on three types of
informal practices: household livelihood strategies, state-
driven informalization of both employment and provision
of social beneﬁts in the public sector, and informal practices
in higher engineering education. Each of these types of
practices pertains to engineers at different stages of their
careers, and engages with a different aspect of welfare
provision in post-Soviet Azerbaijan: the ﬁrst deals with
mid-career engineers whose careers were interrupted by
the transition, but who had to continue to provide informal
support and care for their parents and children at the time
when state provision of pensions and childcare services
became inadequate. The second deals with working
pensioners who are at the same time recipients of social
beneﬁts, particularly old-age pensions. The last type of
informal practices deals with prospective engineers at the
stage of entering the profession and the labor force (stu-
dents), andwho are in the process of receiving public higher
education. Each of these groups is engaged with state in-
stitutions in a different way, and yet all of them share a
pattern of strategically combining formal and informal
practices in order to achieve desired, or at least more or less
acceptable, standards of living and quality of life.
This article is structured as follows: In the following
section I discuss the existing state-of-the art with regards
to informalization of social welfare in post-socialist states.
Second, I provide a brief account of the social welfare
context of Azerbaijan, including information on formal and
informal employment, education, and the social protection
system. Third, I present empirical material on the use of
informal practices by engineers in Azerbaijan in their
livelihood strategies, in public sector jobs, and in profes-
sional education. I conclude with a brief discussion of the
implication of these informal practices for stateesociety
relations and the new ‘social contract’ in Azerbaijan.
2. Welfare in Central and Eastern Europe and former
Soviet Union: similarities and differences
The issue of informality in the post-socialist welfare has
entered the debate somewhat from a back door. From the
beginning of transition and the rollback of welfare regimes
in the post-socialist countries, the main question welfare
scholars had been asking was ‘in what direction are the
post-socialist welfare states developing?’ Thus, much of the
research on post-socialist welfare state in 1990s and early
2000s focused on the classiﬁcation of welfare state regimes
in Central Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union: on
whether they are converging with welfare state regimes of
Western Europe and on the extent to which these regimes
continue to be inﬂuenced by socialist legacies (Aidukaite,
2006; Deacon, 2000; Fenger, 2007; Toots & Backmann,
2010; Wagener, 2002). It was generally accepted that the
welfare state in post-socialist countries can be character-
ized by the residualization of welfare states and the indi-
vidualization of social risks following the adoption of neo-
liberal policies (Babajanian, 2008; Ferge, 1997; Polese
et al., 2014). At the beginning of the transition in the early
1990s, all of the states in the region started out with
comparatively generous welfare state provisions, whichhad been consequently reduced and contracted, resulting
in most cases in inadequate welfare coverage. Within this
broad common trend there have been signiﬁcant differ-
ences. Scholars have developed several typologies of wel-
fare states and welfare regimes in the region, and identiﬁed
different, but sometimes overlapping types of welfare re-
gimes: former USSR type (including Belarus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine), developing welfare state
type (Georgia, Romania andMoldova) (Fenger, 2007), Baltic
type (Toots & Backmann, 2010). Welfare regime approach
(Esping-Andersen, 1990) has been the dominant frame-
work of analysis. Welfare regime refers to “the institutional
arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and
shape concurrent social policy decisions, expenditure de-
velopments, problem deﬁnitions, and even the respond-
and-demand structure of citizens and welfare consumers”
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 80).
However, the welfare regime approach has been criti-
cized for excessive emphasis on policy (Polese et al., 2014).
Scholars working in the ethnographic tradition have
underlined the mismatch between formally adopted na-
tional or regional policies and their implementation. These
policies may often be modiﬁed, sabotaged, or even boy-
cotted by street-level bureaucrats, other interest groups
and cultural norms (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Pascall &
Manning, 2000; Polese et al., 2014). While the legacy of
strong state institutionalization had prevented develop-
ment of formal non-state welfare actors (such as market
and non-proﬁt actors), reliance on the private sphere net-
works such as family or regional ties gave rise to alternative
and parallel structures of welfare provision that comple-
ment or compete with the state. These informal structures
‘ﬁll the gap’ betweenwhat the state ‘claims to do’ vs what it
‘is doing in reality’ (Polese et al., 2014). Thus, the paradox of
post-socialist welfare provision is that the partial with-
drawal of the state produced informalization rather than
proliferation of multiple-actor welfare systems. This
informalization is connected to the processes of ‘domesti-
cation’ and ‘privatization’ of the state that had been noted
by many ethnographers working in the region (Polese,
2008; Stenning, Smith, Rochovska, & Swia˛tek, 2010).
The importance of informality in welfare provision and
the insufﬁcient attention to these practices in existing
research becomes especially obvious when one looks at
welfare in the Caucasus and Central Asia. To date, most
research has focused on CEE countries and the European
part of the former Soviet Union, with relatively little
attention paid to the Caucasus and Central Asia, with the
exception of Georgia. Most of the countries of this region,
including Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, or Uzbeki-
stan, were considered ‘laggards’ in terms of social policy
reform (Deacon, 2000), and rarely merited individual focus.
However, the few available studies on the Caucasus and
Central Asia suggest that the concepts of welfare state and
welfare regime are not easily applicable to these countries
(Babajanian, 2008; Collier &Way, 2004; Gugushvili, 2010;
Habibov & Fan, 2007; Urinboyev, 2011). The welfare mix
in these countries includes components that are rarely
taken into account by the welfare state regime approach,
such as family support, mutual aid networks, remittances of
labor migrants, international aid, or local self-governance
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Gugushvili, 2010; Urinboyev, 2011). Many of these ele-
ments are either informal (mutual support networks, re-
mittances) or located at the border of the formal and the
informal (mahalla system in Uzbekistan). While there exist
some analytical frameworks inclusive of informal practices
in welfare, such as ‘informal security regime’ (Wood &
Gough, 2006) and ‘welfare pentagon’ (de Neubourg,
2002),1 they had been developed in different contexts of
the developing world and do not take into account the
speciﬁc institutional legacy of socialist welfare states
(Babajanian, 2008; Urinboyev, 2011). The relative lack of
empirical studies and the inadequacy of the existing theo-
retical models suggest a need for both more contextual
empirical research and better theorizing that explores the
role of informality in the welfare provision in the Eastern
part of the post-socialist realm.
In this article, I aim to provide both a description of the
way inwhich formal and informal practices are intertwined
in provision of welfare in Azerbaijan, and a conceptualiza-
tion of the relationship between the two. But before pro-
ceeding to the empirical material on which this research is
based, a short description of the formal system of social
protection in Azerbaijan is in order.3. Social protection system in Azerbaijan
Formal social protection system in Azerbaijan shares
many similarities with other post-socialist and especially
post-Soviet countries. Like elsewhere in the region, after
the sharp decline in GDP in the 1990s, the social welfare
system has been residualized and many of the previously
public services became re-commodiﬁed. This process has
been especially visible in the area of social services, such as
housing, childcare, healthcare and education. Previously,
these services were either free or heavily subsidized, often
provided through state owned enterprises. In the post-
socialist period, these schemes were either suspended or
signiﬁcantly reduced. Even formally free public services,
such as primary healthcare and education usually require
out-of-pocket informal payments (Lepisto & Kazimzade,
2008; Rzayeva, 2013; Temple & Petrov, 2004). At the
same time, further strain was put on the social welfare
system in Azerbaijan by the emergence of large numbers of
refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and war vet-
erans following the military conﬂict in Nagorno-Karabakh.2
These groups became the primary target groups of social1 Informal security regime refers to a type of institutional arrangement
where people meet their security needs through community and family
relationships. Wood and Gough (2006) contend that such arrangements,
which are mostly found in the countries of Latin America and South Asia,
are usually based on clientelistic relationships, where people trade their
short term security for long term dependency and vulnerability. ‘Welfare
pentagon’ is a model of welfare comprised of ﬁve core institutions:
family, markets, social networks, membership institutions and public
authorities.
2 The term ‘Internally Displaced Persons’, or ‘IDPs’, refers to people who
had been forced to ﬂee their homes, usually in the result of an armed
conﬂict, but did not cross international borders in their ﬂight. In
Azerbaijan, following the armed conﬂict with Armenia over Nagorno-
Karabakh region in 1989e1994, there are over 600,000 IDPs (UNHCR).assistance beneﬁts including free access to public services
and even housing assistance (Habibov & Fan, 2007).
Currently, the formal social protection system in
Azerbaijan ismade up of two components: social insurance,
which includes various pensions (old age, disability, survi-
vor) and unemployment beneﬁts, and social assistance
(various cash beneﬁts, tax subsidies, etc., which target
speciﬁc categories of people who are expected to be at a
greater risk of poverty, such as families with small children,
IDPs, refugees and, war veterans and their families, and
people with disabilities). The largest of the existing social
protection programs is the old age pension, which covers
61% of all welfare recipients (Habibov & Fan, 2007: 53). At
the other end of the spectrum is the unemployment beneﬁts
program, with almost negligible coverage of 0.19% of wel-
fare recipients (Habibov& Fan, 2007: 53). Overall, the social
protection system has been characterized as providing
wide, but thin coverage (Aliyev, Valiyev,&Rustamova, 2011:
75; Falkingham & Vlachantoni, 2012).
Azerbaijan's social protection system carries signiﬁcant
Soviet institutional legacies. In particular, the method of
collection of contributions for old age pensions is very
similar to the Soviet one, with 22% of gross wages
contributed by the employer and 3% by the employee
(Aliyev et al., 2011: 112). However, pension reform, imple-
mented in consultation with international organizations
such as the IMF, World Bank and UNDP, has been underway
since 2006. According to this reform, the amount of base
pension has already been increased to 85 AZN (76 euro)
making it the secondmost generous base pension in former
Soviet Union after Kazakhstan (Aliyev et al.: 112). Another
element of the reform is change of the retirement age:
currently, it is 58 and 63 years for women and men,
respectively, but it will reach 60 and 65 in 2016 (Law on
Pensions, 2006). This is a considerable increase from the
generous Soviet retirement entitlement at 55 (women) and
60 (men). The purpose of this change is to cope with the
combined pressure of shrinking contributions, mainly due
to increasing informal labor (more on this below) and
population aging, and the stable number of those entitled
to old-age pensions. A speciﬁc problem of the social pro-
tection system in Azerbaijan is the large number of refugees
and IDPs (about 1 million people) as well as war veterans,
due to the Karabakh conﬂict, all of whom are recipients of
various forms of social assistance. This assistance includes
cash transfers, tax privileges and various state subsidies,
such as free education, basic healthcare etc.
The existing formal social protection system remains an
important safety net, especially for the poor, but it is not
suited to either alleviate poverty or to provide adequate
living standards. Interestingly, although the state in
Azerbaijan formally did not withdraw from the provision of
welfare, the family is legally recognized as a welfare pro-
vider. Article 34 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan states that
it is the “responsibility of children is to respect parents and
look after them. Childrenwho are of age (18) and capable of
working must support disabled parents” (Constitution).
Thus, it is expected that the deﬁciencies in the state pro-
vision should be ﬁlled by families. The reliance on family
networks is neither new nor speciﬁc to Azerbaijan. How-
ever, in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, this is often seen as part of
3 All names are anonymized.
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unlike inmany post-Soviet contexts, codiﬁed. Family values
form the central notions of this mentality, while family
networks serve as the main basis for social organization
and for the provision and ﬁnancing of many forms of social
welfare (Heyat, 2002; Kaneff & Yalçın-Heckmann, 2003;
Tohidi, 1997).
Another problem with the state system of social pro-
tection in Azerbaijan is that it only receives contributions
from formal economic activities. Yet, existing macroeco-
nomic research indicates that Azerbaijan has one of the
largest informal economies in the region, at around 60% of
GDP (Schneider, 2009). Even this ﬁgure is likely to be an
underestimation, as macroeconomic indicators usually
underestimate real size of informal sector (Morris& Polese,
2014a: 2). Azerbaijan also has large participation of the
labor force in the informal sector, estimated at 38% of the
total labor force in 2001 (Yoon et al., 2003).
Existing research on informality in Azerbaijan suggests
that it is a pervasive phenomenon with deep roots going
back at least to the Soviet period (Grossman, 1989; Mars &
Altman, 1983; Suny, 1989; Zemtsov, 1976). Yet the speciﬁc
forms of informality and mechanisms of informalization
remain little understood despite growing number of
empirical studies (Auty & De Soysa, 2006; B€orzel & Pamuk,
2012; Dedeoglu, 2011; Guliyev, 2012; Lepisto & Kazimzade,
2008; Saﬁyev, 2013; Silova, Johnson, & Heyneman, 2007;
Stefes, 2005; Yalçın-Heckmann, 2010, 2013; Yalçin-
Heckmann & Aivazishvili, 2012). Most of the existing
research focuses either on informal economy (Dedeoglu,
2011; Yalçın-Heckmann, 2010, 2013; Yalçin-Heckmann &
Aivazishvili, 2012) or on corruption and the patron-client
relations in the political sphere (Auty & De Soysa, 2006;
B€orzel & Pamuk, 2012; Guliyev, 2012; Stefes, 2005), cre-
ates a misguided impression of the autonomy of the two
spheres. In this respect, a micro-level study of informal
practices related towelfare provision is especially useful for
understanding the ways in which informal practices link
the state, economy and society in Azerbaijan.
4. Sample and methodology
The empirical material on which this paper is based
comes from a larger study on the transformation of the
engineering profession in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. The study
includes semi-structured biographical interviews with 42
engineers, conducted between December 2010 and March
2013. 39 Interviews were conducted in Baku, and three in
Houston, TX, USA, which is the most popular destination
for internationallymobile Azerbaijani engineers working in
the oil industry. The sample included “Soviet” and “post-
Soviet” cohorts (34 and 8 engineers, respectively), referring
to the period in which these engineers entered their pro-
fession, with the aim to trace changes and continuities in
recruitment practices, the organization of professional ac-
tivities, transnational links and work attitudes in the post-
Soviet period. Slightly over a third of the interviewees were
female (15 out of 42). The interviews lasted between
45min and 3 h, with an average interview lasting about 1 h.
19 of the interviews are fully recorded; they were then
transcribed and manually coded. When intervieweesdeclined the request to be recorded, I took extensive notes
and later reconstructed the interviews from memory and
ﬁeld notes.
Although informality was not the primary focus of the
study, it attractedmy attention early on during the research
as it ﬁgured prominently in engineers' accounts of their
work and personal lives in the post-Soviet period. Most of
the Soviet-educated engineers who had previously worked
in industrial enterprises had been informally self-employed
for more or less prolonged periods of time in the post-
Soviet period. Among those employed in the public sector,
mostly research institutes, various formal and informal
consulting, as well as moonlighting, were common. Both of
these groups of engineers have skillfully combined work
and welfare, both formal and informal. For the younger,
post-Soviet generation of engineers, informal practices in
education were of a great concern, not the other forms of
informal activities that their older peers described.
Although only a third of my interviewees were female,
in this article I use more examples from female informants
than frommales. This is because during the interviews men
tended to emphasize the content of their work and their
professional achievements, while women focused more on
relationships and provided more coherent narratives of
engagement with welfare state which are better suited for
presentation in this article. Yet all of the examples I site
here are also corroborated by the interviews with male
engineers, and the practices I describe are common for both
men and women.
5. ‘Bricolage’ of formal and informal: coping
strategies and a ‘decent’ life
Household strategies for poverty alleviation are perhaps
the most researched area of informality, both in post-
socialist contexts and beyond (Clarke, 2002; Mrozowicki,
2011; Stenning, 2005; Stenning et al., 2010). Many of
these strategies, including those that have to do with
welfare provision, such as informal childcare by grandpar-
ents or support of the elderly by younger generations, are
found all over the world (Polese et al., 2014; Strangleman,
2001). Here, I present a rather typical post-Soviet
example of livelihood strategy of a family of two engi-
neers, Nadir and Lena.3 My focus however is not on their
survival strategy per se, but on the ways in which formal
and informal, work and social assistance, public and private
sources are all strategically combined in order to achieve a
‘decent life’.
Nadir and Lena are both engineers, whomarried and had
two children in 1980s. Nadir, a mechanical engineer, who
had been the primary breadwinner for his family by the
beginning of transition, became unemployed in 1990 when
the defense industry plant where he had been working,
closed down. During his unemployment, although he never
ofﬁcially registered as unemployed, he engaged in a variety
of informal jobs, including a job at a shoe-makingworkshop
and moonlighting as part of an apartment refurbishment
brigade repairing air conditioners. In 1992, he returned to
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trial plant. But the formal job often did not pay at all, and he
frequently had to resort to informal work again. Between
1990 and 1992, while Nadir had no formal employment, his
wife Lena remained securely formally employed at a
manufacturing plant, where she received a meager salary
and sometimes in-kind food provision instead of salary.
However, once Nadir had found formal job, Lena began to
work informally, ﬁrst as a waitress in a cafe, and then as a
cleaning lady for a British expatriate. In the meantime, she
had been formally registered as an employee (‘gave her
labor book’4) at yet another state enterprise. She did not go
to work there, neither did she receive any salary from this
ofﬁcial workplace, but this was seen as necessary for
keeping uninterrupted working experience (stazh) e a
condition for qualifying for an old age state pension when
the time came. In 1997 Lena had found a new formal job, as
an advertisement manager with a small newspaper, which
she continued to combine with informal house-cleaning.
The informal work was the primary source of income.
Throughout these years, they also relied on the housework,
help with childcare, as well as the small old-age pension of
Nadir's mother, until she passed away in 2000. In 2003,
Nadirwas offered a formal job in a private enterprise owned
by a former colleague from one of the industrial plants
where he used to work before. As Lena's income became
less important for the family, in 2004 she left employment
altogether and became a home-maker. This time, Lena did
not seek to have her ‘labor book’ registered anywhere, as
she had already accumulated the number of years of
working experience necessary for a public old-age pension.
At the same time she is not registered as unemployede she
simply became invisible to the formal beneﬁt system.
In a way, this is a post-socialist success story: this family
managed to overcome poverty, partially return to profes-
sional work, and overall re-establish their middle class
status e something that few of the de-professionalized
engineers I interviewed were able to do. Of course, this
was done at the expense of Lena's career, a sacriﬁce she
accepts humbly despite regrets of leaving professional
employment. This story also supports the developmental
perspective on informal work: once formal jobs are sufﬁ-
ciently well paid, people no longer hold on to their informal
employment. Yet, here I am more interested in the brico-
lage of formal and informal that this family had been
forging for many years. First, we can observe a change in
the meaning of formal employment in the public sector:
during transition, it ceased being the primary source of
employment or income, yet it remained important as the
primary link to the state and the social protection system.
Thus, while Nadir was formally unemployed but generated
income through informal jobs, Lena held on to her formal
work, however meagerly paid. At that time, she made no
attempt to seek informal work herself e as it would have
been too risky to leave the family without the security of at4 ‘Labor book’ refers to an ofﬁcial document where all formal
employment experience is recorded. The labor book is issued to an
employee at her ﬁrst formal job and is later used for calculating pension
upon retirement.least one formal job. Only when Nadir found permanent
formal job did she ﬁnally leave hers and engaged in
informal income-generating activities. And even then, she
maintained a ﬁctitious formal employment relationship
simply to ensure future claims to social beneﬁts. Despite
the general disillusionment with the state, and its with-
drawal from its Soviet-time welfare and job creating
functions, which both Nadir and Lena strongly disapproved
of, they did not stop relying on the state as a minimal safety
net. The practice of keeping one's labor book at some public
sector organization, which seems to be rather widespread,
is particularly interesting in this regard. The potential
accumulation of pensionable years appears to be more
important than formal unemployment beneﬁts.5 In this
sense, the state is seen as a better guarantor of ﬁnancial
security across the lifecourse,6 than a provider of immedi-
ate support in case of failures of market mechanisms of
employment.
The second important feature of this formal/informal
strategizing is that it went beyond mere survival and pro-
vision of subsistence minimum. Throughout the transition,
a major concern for Nadir and Lena had been the education
and upbringing of their two children. At the most difﬁcult
times they continued to pay for private lessons and extra-
curricular activities of their children, such as music and
sport, ﬁlling in for a withdrawn and disinterested welfare
state. Previously, these services were either provided free
of charge or highly subsidized; but as they became com-
modities Nadir and Lena did not simply withdraw their
children from them, but rather made an extra effort to
provide for what they saw as necessary for the future of
their children, for their having ‘decent lives’. Often, these
activities had to be paid for at the expense of food and other
necessities. Their notion of ‘decent life’ is clearly a middle-
class one; maintaining social class position of their children
through education. Yet, not all of the Soviet-time entitle-
ments have been treated in this way e for example, Nadir
and Lena had given up the practice of family vacations, but
not of the extracurricular activities of their children. This
represents resistance to the residualization of social wel-
fare, when some, but not all, of the previously available
social services are deemed as more important than others.
These household-centered strategies of formal/informal
bricolage would, however, be impossible without the
cooperation of employers who act in the capacity of low
level bureaucrats in public sector workplaces. In the above
example, it was the employers who had arranged for Lena's
formal registration, as well as supported and encouraged
informal income generating activities of Nadir. Here, the
informal relations are important, as well as the willingness
of employer/bureaucrat to engage in needs/means or merit
testing. My next example directly addresses the informal-
izing practices of state bureaucracies.5 Unemployment beneﬁts in Azerbaijan are calculated as 70% of
average monthly wages in the 12 months prior to registering as unem-
ployed, but cannot exceed the average monthly salary. Unemployment
beneﬁts can be paid no longer than 26 weeks in any 12 months period
(Aliyev et al., 62). In the ﬁrst half of 2014 average salary in Azerbaijan was
estimated at AZN438 (USD559) (Macroeconomic Indicators, 2014).
6 I am grateful to anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.
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As mentioned above, in Azerbaijan the ofﬁcial retire-
ment age is set at 58 years old for women and 63 years old
for men. However, many retirement age employees prefer
not to retire but to continue to work for as long as their
health allows, because pensions are low and do not provide
for the same standard of living as salaries. Employees of
state enterprises who reach this age are rarely required to
leave their jobs immediately. Rather, they enter a space of
ambiguity, wheremanagement can easily give or take away
their jobs, and they have little inﬂuence over the process. A
formal adjustment that allows this is the annually renew-
able contracte a practice that began to be introduced in the
public sector in the early 2000s instead of traditional Soviet
open-ended employment contracts.7 At the time of intro-
ducing this novelty, it was presented as a simple formality,
and indeed in most cases the underemployed and under-
paid public sector employees simply signed a new contract
every year without any change in their status, salary, or
working conditions. Yet, this practice has created an op-
portunity for the administration to regulate their staff
without the need for any formal lay-offs. Decisions about
the employment of retirement age professionals are solely
at the discretion of the administration, and there are no
formal rules on whose contracts can or cannot be renewed,
or who can be asked to become a consultant. Public sector
employers utilize different forms of ﬂexible working ar-
rangements for retirement age professionals, including
consulting contracts and part-time work. Of about 14
retirement age professionals who had been working in the
public sector that I interviewed, ﬁve described working
under such ﬂexible working arrangements. But in some
cases these arrangements reach a point of absurdity, when
formal (i.e. employer, job title, job description) and informal
(actual work done) contracts are two different things.
The case in point here is Aliya (born 1944), a power
engineer with 50 years of experience in an energy-related
production association. Upon reaching her retirement age
in 2001, Aliya continued to work in her old workplace, and
received her full salary and half of her age related pension,
as per Azerbaijani labor regulations. In 2004 her open-
ended contract was changed to an annual one, without
any visible change in her life: it was renewed year after
year. Then, in 2009, there was an administrative decision at
the top level of management not to renew the contracts
with all those who had reached retirement age, from
cleaners to top specialists. So along with other retirement
age employees, Aliya was released from her job. However,
two months after her formal retirement Aliya was invited
by the management to sign a new employment contract.
Interestingly, the newcontract was notwith the production
association, but with a research institute, which, although
institutionally related to the production association, is a7 Several of my interviewees as well as other acquaintances from public
sector mentioned this practice. There is no such requirement in the Labor
Code (Labor Code, 1999), and the open-ended contract is still possible.
Yet, this has been a de-facto practice.separate legal entity. Her new position was ‘senior
researcher’, and her salary was set at two thirds of what she
used to receive at the production association. However,
despite having a different job title, different salary and
different employer, Aliya continues to work at her old
workplace and to do exactly the same work she did before.
This was not an individual case e all ‘valuable specialists’
were offered similar contracts with the research institute,
she said.
It is difﬁcult to classify Aliya's working arrangement as
belonging to the informal economy in the sense that it is
neither undocumented nor unregulated work. She has a
formal job, receives ofﬁcial salary, and her formal employer
pays regular taxes and welfare beneﬁts. Rather, this case
resembles Soviet-time practices of false or ﬁctitious ac-
counting. The best researched example of such practices
was pripiski, or paddling ofﬁcial production ﬁgures to show
over-fulﬁllment of plans (Barsukova & Radaev, 2012), but
ﬁctitious reporting actually went beyond that and encom-
passed all spheres of economy, including labor and wages
practices. Interviews and anecdotal evidence suggests that
in the post-Soviet public sector in Azerbaijan such ﬁctitious
reporting is still practiced, although it is not possible to
assess its prevalence. Other examples of similar practices
are labor-book keeping that I mentioned above, or envelope
wages which are usually discussed in the framework of tax
evasion in the private sector (seeWilliams, 2008). However,
in Azerbaijan, this practice also takes place in the public
sector workplaces, including state-owned companies and
the bureaucratic apparatus (Saﬁyev, 2013, author's in-
terviews). Here, the purpose is not so much tax evasion, but
the reallocation of informally collected revenues.
Returning to the working arrangements of retirement
age professionals, it is important to note that their access to
welfare is an important consideration for the employers
who choose ﬂexible arrangement options. Pensions pro-
vide regular and stable income; although this income is
insufﬁcient for providing adequate living standards, it is a
signiﬁcant contribution that is used by employers to justify
lower salaries. In this sense, the employers are engaged in
themeans-testing of their employees. On the other hand, in
making decisions about employment of such retirement
age professionals, administration becomes involved in the
‘evaluation of personhood’ (Polese et al., 2014) of former
full time employees, as they consider their family situations
and engage in informal needs-testing in addition to
assessing professional qualiﬁcations. An example of such
an approach can be observed in the case of Fahriyya (born
in 1940), a chemical research engineer who had experience
of ﬂexible work, working at different times under part-time
contract and under consulting contracts. In her capacity as
the chief of a laboratory (while employed part-time) she
was also a low level bureaucrat and was involved inmaking
employment decisions. After their research institute was
closed in 2009, Fahriyya found employment for a former
colleague, also of retirement age. This included a part-time
job at another research institute as well as consulting on
two different projects. Inmaking these decisions, Fahriyya's
considerations included not only the evaluation of profes-
sional qualiﬁcations of this colleague but also of her
personal circumstances. Thus, the colleague in question
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would allow her to provide childcare assistance to her
daughter. The research institute where Fahriyya found her
job was located close to her home and thus ﬁt this purpose
well.
The examples provided here are important for several
reasons. First, they demonstrate how formal welfare is
made part of informal considerations about access to work
and the speciﬁcs of the employment contract. The ar-
rangements I discussed in this section challenge the
generally assumed relationship between paid work and
welfare beneﬁts, where work, or ability to work, determine
access to state welfare. Here, we see just the opposite: ac-
cess to state beneﬁts (Aliya) or welfare needs (Fahriyya's
protege) determine access to certain kinds of employment.
It is important to note that the reversal of this work-
ewelfare relationship is informal, and depends on the
discretion of the management rather than any formal rules.
Second, these work-pension arrangements show how the
legacies of both formal (pension system) and informal
(ﬁctitious reporting) Soviet institutions continue to shape
work and welfare practices in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. In
constructing these arrangements, bureaucrats and em-
ployees do not create something anew, but rather make use
of time-tested repertoires of action. Finally, the cases
described here shift attention from the individuals who
seek to maximize their welfare outcomes to the complex
arrangements that take place between public sector em-
ployers and individual employees, as well as their families.
7. Informal practices in education: becoming
professional
Informal practices in post-socialist public educational
systems are well known and researched (Morris & Polese,
2014b; Osipian, 2009; Silova & Bray, 2005; Silova et al.,
2007; Temple & Petrov, 2004). In particular, corruption,
i.e. the practice of informal payments for grades, exams
and degrees is a widespread problem in many of these
countries (Osipian, 2009; Temple& Petrov, 2004). Scholars
have focused on different countries and different aspects
of these payments (Morris & Polese, 2014b; Osipian, 2009;
Temple & Petrov, 2004). Overall, corruption in education,
and especially in higher education has been shown to be
detrimental for social cohesion (Silova et al., 2007); in
addition, it leads to devaluation of formal credentials as
well as production of credentialed but incompetent pro-
fessionals (Temple & Petrov, 2004). Azerbaijan is a country
where corruption in public higher education is especially
common: while in Ukraine and Russia it is reported to be
possible to graduate without ever paying any informal
payments, in Azerbaijan this is considered near to
impossible (Temple & Petrov, 2004: 90, author's in-
terviews). General public opinion agrees that Azerbaijan's
higher education system is in decline and in a deep crisis,
and this refers to all public higher educational institutions
and most of private ones regardless of specialization
(Temple & Petrov, 2004; author's interviews). In many
cases, people report that informal payments are not just an
option, but rather that they are actively demanded by
instructors.Yet, despite the proliferation of bribery and the deval-
uation of credentials, competent professionals continue to
emerge from this deeply corrupt educational system. I have
interviewed four internationally successful engineers
whose only formal professional education was acquired in
post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Three of them who had studied in
public institutions reported high levels of corruption there
and admitted to have sometimes participated in those
practices. Nevertheless, several of my interviewees pointed
out that graduates of public engineering schools, especially
the oldest one, the Oil Academy, show better results than
graduates from private universities with reportedly lower
levels of corruption. In this article I therefore propose to ask
a different kind of question about informality in higher
education: ‘how is it possible that competent professionals
still emerge from a thoroughly corrupt educational sys-
tem?’ The answer to this question also involves informal
practices that are employed by students, instructors, and
other professionals in order to circumvent the deﬁciencies
in the education system, including both formal (under-
funding, outdated technology, etc) and informal ones
(bribery). The following account by Elmira, a drilling engi-
neer currently working in a transnational engineering
company (graduated from Oil Academy in 2008) is illumi-
nating in this regard.
Elmira described her experience with formal education
as ‘hell’ due to corruption. According to her estimates, be-
tween 30 and 40% of instructors did not just accept informal
payments for grades when offered, but extorted them from
students by various means, including direct demands,
selling high grades prior to exams, giving lower grades or
demanding extra work from those who refused to pay.
Another 30% of instructors did not demand payments, but
accepted them when offered, and only about 30% were not
involved in this process. As one of the top students in her
class, Elmira struggled for the ﬁrst two years to study and
receive good grades without payments, but then she gave
up. Instead, she became a group leader (starosta) and per-
formed amiddleperson role for her group, collectingmoney
before the exams and passing it on to instructors. This way,
she was freed from the demands from instructors herself,
and could concentrate on her studies. However, she found
that the education provided in the academy was not sufﬁ-
cient. She used informal connections with peers and in-
structors to obtain recent literature that was unavailable in
the university library; this helped her win a competition for
summer internship in a transnational oil company in Baku,
which in turn gave her a head start both for her studies and
for future employment. After that ﬁrst internship, she spent
her summers working for this transnational company, and
eventually was hired full time upon graduation.
Elmira, as well as other engineering students in oil
related departments, was also lucky to have access to in-
ternships with international companies working in Baku's
booming oil industry sector. These companies and their
programs for training and career advancement are few of
the available examples of more or less transparent formal
structures for the young generation of engineers. For those
outside of the scope of interests of the transnational oil
companies, the options of professional development
beyond the basics provided by formal education are limited
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An example of such learning strategy could be found in the
case of Namik, another 2008 graduate, an electrical engi-
neer. Such students usually employ connections (often of
their families) to start working informally during their
studies, thus complementing outdated theoretical educa-
tion with practical work experience. Building professional
networks, gaining professional ‘respect’, or reputation, and
learning from other professionals are crucial for their
career development. On the other hand, older engineers,
such as Aliya and Nadir, see mentoring the young as one of
their main functions. By doing this, they see themselves as
compensating for the deﬁciencies of the formal education
system and contributing to the continuity in the transfer of
knowledge from one generation to another.
These examples suggest that as corruption becomes
widespread, the responsibility for providing education,
understood as acquiring knowledge and skills rather than
just credentials, is being shifted towards individuals: stu-
dents, individual instructors, and professional mentors. In
this sense, we can no longer speak of ‘system of public
education’ as a uniﬁed and formalized structure, but rather
about educational practices, which are becoming increas-
ingly informalized and individualized. The important issue
here is that while individuals resist devaluation of their
degrees and credentials, they do not just opt out of the
system, nor create collective alternative forms of education,
but rather embrace the individualization of this formerly
universal social right.
8. Conclusion
The examples presented here demonstrate that the
boundary between formal and informal in Azerbaijan is
very ﬂuid and easily penetrable. Formal and informal
structures, networks and procedures are closely inter-
twined, and although separated analytically, are insepa-
rable in practice. In fact, people rarely attempt to separate
the two, but rather employ strategies that skillfully
combine formal and informal in order to achieve their
desired goals such as ‘decent life’, ‘decent old age’ or
‘proper education’. In doing so, they not only try to
compensate for deﬁciencies of formal structures, but rather
interact with state actors who are themselves actively
involved in reproducing informality. Social protection sys-
tem on the one hand and public education on the other
provide a fertile ground for such combined practices. Un-
like the more closely monitored and strictly controlled civil
service, in these two spheres the state at the same retains
its strong presence as a chief provider of welfare and ed-
ucation, while allowing individual agency.
In terms of the two major changes in the post-socialist
welfare provision, namely residualization and individuali-
zation of social risks, the impact of informal practices has
been ambivalent. While residualization is opposed, indi-
vidualization has been generally accepted. On the one
hand, people resist residualization, and attempt to com-
plement the residual state provision through informal
means. This is particularly obvious in education: where
students, their families, and committed professionals try to
compensate for declining quality of public educationthrough private tutoring, self-education and professional
mentoring. Thus, the idea of what education should be is
very different from what is really offered, especially in the
public sector. At the same time, people have largely
accepted that it is their own responsibility to achieve that
level of education; the informal practices they engage in are
targeted towards individuals and do not exert any pressure
on the state to change policy. This tacit agreement between
state and society may indicate an emergence of a new post-
Soviet social contract in Azerbaijan (Cook, 1993), where the
state refrains from enforcing its formal regulations and
leaves broad space for informal activities in exchange for
society refraining from demands for thorough reform.
Thus, while the state no longer provides adequate welfare,
it leaves open avenues for achieving these goals at one's
own risk. Yet, these avenues are semi-formal in the sense
that in order to achieve their goals individuals must not
only engage in private activities, but also cooperate with
state institutions and bureaucrats. As a result, welfare in
Azerbaijan can be characterized not so much by duality of
the formal and informal, but rather by interpenetration and
hybridity of the two.References
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